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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce, of the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for
Utah County, the Honorable James R. Taylor presiding. Jurisdiction to hear this
appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78A-4-103(2)(h) (1953 as amended) and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court properly analyze, weigh, and apply the
statutory and common law custody factors?
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court made a proper child custody
determination is a matter that is within the broad discretion of the trial court, which
may not be overturned absent a clear abuse of the trial court's broad discretion.
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Carsten v. Carsten, 2007
UT App 174, T|3, 164 P.3d 429; Marchandv. Marchand, 2006 UT App 429, | 4 , 147
P.3d 538; Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993); Sukin v. Sukin, 842
P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992); Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195-96 (Utah
App. 1992); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989).

Issue No. 2: Did the trial court properly justify his deviation from the
minimum statutory parent time in his determination or did the trial court properly
reject the custody evaluator's recommendation of joint custody and/or recommended
parent time?
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court made a proper child custody
determination is a matter that is within the broad discretion of the trial court, which
may not be overturned absent a clear abuse of the trial court's broad discretion.
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Carsten v. Carsten, 2007
UT App 174, f3, 164 P.3d 429; Marchandv. Marchand, 2006 UT App 429, f4, 147
P.3d 538; Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993); Sukin v. Sukin, 842
P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992); Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195-96 (Utah
App. 1992); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989). Whether
the trial court properly determined visitation rights is a matter that is within the broad
discretion of the trial court, which may not be overturned absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1992); Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744
P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah App. 1987), cert denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); see also
Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah App. 1990).
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err by determining to exclude Appellant's
expert witness and other evidence (including evidence submitted in compliance with
Rule 26(a)(4)(c))?

Standard of Review: In general, a trial court is granted broad discretion in its
decision to admit or exclude evidence. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).
In "the absence of an abuse of discretion, the trial court's ruling on the admissibility
of evidence will not be disturbed." State v. Castas, 772 P.2d 975, 977 (Utah App.
1989). The trial court has broad discretion concerning the qualification of expert
witnesses, and the appellate courts will not disturb such rulings unless there has been
an abuse of discretion. Carbaugh v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd, 2007 UT 65, *fl, 167 P.3d
1063; Stevensen 3rdEast, LCv. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, | 2 5 , 210 P.3d 977. "The
trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony and
such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Larsen,
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993); Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d
1242, 1347 (Utah 1993) (court of appeals incorrectly applied "clear error standard" to
exclusion of expert testimony when proper standard was abuse of discretion); State v.
Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 n.l (Utah 1991) (trial court has discretion in Rule 704 and
702 decisions); Rees v. Intermountain Health Care} Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Utah
1991); Casida v. Deland, 866 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah App. 1993); Robb v. Anderton, 863
P.2d 1322, 1326 (Utah App. 1993) (Rule 702 reviewed for abuse of discretion); State
v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 471 (Utah App. 1993) (Rule 703 determination is
reviewed for abuse of discretion); Walker v. Union Pac. R.R., 884 P.2d 335, 343

o

(Utah App. 1992) (Rule 702 determination will not be reversed "absent a clear abuse
of discretion.").
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court appropriately decline to award attorney's fees
to the Appellant after making earlier findings regarding Appellee's contempt?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court should award attorney's fees in a
divorce case is a matter that is within the broad discretion of the trial court, which
may not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d
1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994); Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 967 (Utah App. 1994);
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992); Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d
1027, 1031 (Utah App. 1992); Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991)
(both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within
sound discretion of the trial court); Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah App.
1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to this
appeal.
Statutes: Utah Code Annotated, Sections 30-3-3; 30-3-10; 30-3-10.2; 30-3-33;
30-3-34; 30-3-35; 30-3-35.5; 30-3-37; 78A-4-103; 78B-12-203
Rules: Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3.
Utah Rules of Evidence 702

Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-903
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The mother (Appellant) filed a Petition and Complaint for Divorce on October
20, 2006. She sought temporary orders by motion regarding custody, etc. A hearing
was held on November 21, 2006. At that time, the parties stipulated to appointment
of a Guardian Ad Litem, and continued the hearing to January 9, 2007. On January 9,
2007, Commissioner Thomas Patton, after hearing, made a recommendation that the
father (Appellee) be awarded custody of the children, and made other
recommendations. The mother objected to the Commissioner's recommendations,
and a full evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Taylor on March 23, 2007. At
the hearing on March 23, 2007, Judge Taylor awarded the father temporary custody
during the school year, awarded the mother parent-time during the summer, and made
other orders incident thereto. The trial court also bifurcated the case, and granted a
Decree of Divorce.
A few days after the Decree of Divorce was entered, the mother and her new
husband married. A custody evaluation was ordered, and Dr. Jay Jensen was
appointed by the trial court to conduct the evaluation.
Because of the father's confusion over whether he was entitled to deduct
medical and daycare expenses for the children from his summer child support
obligation (when the children were with their mother) and whether the support

obligations would be pro-rated based on the dates the children went to visit the
mother, he calculated that he had paid the support amounts in full. When the mother
brought the matter before the district court, the trial court found that the father's
deductions and calculations of the amounts he owed were incorrect, and held the
father in contempt for partial non-payment of the support. The Court allowed the
father to purge the contempt by paying $175 per month toward the arrearage—
reserving the issue of attorney fees and costs for consideration at trial.
After the custody evaluation was completed, trial was held on June 2nd and 3rd
2008. The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 11, 2008. That
decision was later augmented and clarified by a supplemental ruling on September 24,
2008. After some additional wrangling over the exact language of the final order, a
final order was entered on March 24, 2009. The mother filed her Notice of Appeal on
April 22, 2009.
Subsequent to the appeal, the mother relocated to Utah, filed a Petition to
Modify custody and parent-time, and sought a temporary custody and visitation order.
The parties reached a stipulated custody and parent-time agreement during the
pendency of the case, and trial court entered an order consistent with the parties'
agreement.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case are as follows (for clarity, the factual recitation will refer
to the Appellant as the mother and to the Appelle as the father).
1.

The parties were the married parents of five minor children, ranging in

age (at the time of trial) from eleven to four years. (R at 693, p. 13)
2.

Prior to the parties' marriage, the mother had a series of sexual

relationships with various men to whom she was not married. Those relationships
resulted in the birth of three other children from three separate men. The mother does
not know the identity of at least one of the fathers of those children. Her church
excommunicated her for that behavior. (R. at 687, p. 3; R. at 693, pp. 123-124)
3.

The mother credited the father for helping reform her life (R. at 693 p.

125; R. at 687, p. 3), and indicated that the father was a good man who had always
been committed to their relationship. (R. at 693, p. 128)
4.

In July of 2006, the mother made a trip to Las Vegas for an Herbal Life

convention. While there, she sought out and secretly visited Tom Bradley, a man
with whom she had been romantically involved previously (during the time Mr.
Bradley was serving an LDS mission to Columbia). That began a series of secret
visits, and a romantic relationship with Mr. Bradley. (R. at 693, p. 122-123, 125-127;
R. at 687, p. 6)

5.

Mr. Bradley was much wealthier than the father, and the mother wanted

the additional benefits of having access to Mr. Bradley's additional financial
resources. (R. at 693, p. 129)
6.

The mother also decided to end the marriage because she felt that she

was about to be successful in her Herbal Life business, and she did not want to share
her success with the father. (R. at 693, pp. 147-148; R. at 687, p. 23).
7.

Subsequently, the mother left the parties' children and their father, and

moved to Las Vegas to live with Mr. Bradley, whom she eventually married. (R. at
693, p. 10, 12)
8.

The mother's decision to end her marriage to the father alienated some

of the children. (R. at 687, p. 6)
9.

In leaving the children, the mother failed to consider the impact her

behavior would have on the children, which reflected on her judgment. (R. at 693, pp.
10, 133) In relocating, she "lacked a clear understanding of the potential for splitting
her children from one other, from another parent, and from their community
integration (friends, church, schools, etc.)." She "was blinded to the effect of her
relocation on the children." (R. at 687, pp. 10, 21, 23)
10.

The mother has failed to realize the nature and importance of the

children's relationship with their father, as well as the consequences of moving them
to Las Vegas. She seems to view herself as the only central person in the children's

o

lives, as opposed to the father, who realizes that both he and the mother play a crucial
role in the lives of their children. (R. at 694, p. 281-283)
11.

The custody evaluator believed that if the children live with their mother

she will continue to be naive towards the importance of the father's role in the lives of
the children. She is likely to limit the free development of the children's relationship
with their father. (R. at 694, p. 283)
12.

The mother left the children in the middle of the school year because

she "wanted to go" to Las Vegas to marry Mr. Bradley. She placed her desire to be
with Mr. Bradley above the children's needs. According to the custody evaluator, she
relinquished her parental role. (R. at 687, pp. 10, 16, 23-24; R. at 693, pp. 31-32, 133,
136-137)
13.

Pending a hearing on temporary custody, the mother's boyfriend helped

her rent an apartment in Utah, near the children; although the apartment was a studio
apartment that was too small to permit her to care for the children at that location. (R.
at 693, pp. 36, 38)
14.

Although she occupied the Utah apartment for a short time, the mother

left the apartment and moved back to Las Vegas a few days after the Court awarded
the father temporary custody of the parties' minor children. (R. at 687, p. 7; R. at 639,
pp. 37-38)

o

15.

The mother is a Hispanic female for whom English is her second

language, and who is not literate in English. (R. at 639, p. 144)
16.

The mother only finished the 10th grade, although she subsequently

obtained a GED. (R. at 687, p. 3; R. at 639, p. 183)
17.

During their marriage, the father did not have many outside friends or

activities. He loved being at home, during which time he cared for the parties'
children, and their needs, together with housework and grocery shopping. He also
took the children to doctor appointments, participated with them in school functions
and other events. (R. at 639, pp. 21-23; R at 694, p. 455)
18.

The father managed the household funds, and the mother didn't know

anything about the parties' finances. (R. at 639, p. 27)
19.

One of the parties' minor children, M.G., has been diagnosed with

Selective Mutism and Social Phobia, disorders that causes her to be afraid of people
and novel situations. She does not respond well to change, and shuts down "in
anxiety provoking situations and become[s] completely socially unresponsive." (R. at
687, p. 11; R. at 693, pp. 67 and 183)
20.

Pursuant to the Court's temporary order, the father was assigned

responsibility for managing M.G.'s therapy for her Selective Mutism and Social
Phobia disorders. The mother was aware of that order. (R. at 693, p. 163)

m

21.

The father sought input from the mother regarding the possibility of

placing M.G. on a prescription medication; but the mother failed to provide any input
to him. Having not received any input from the mother, the father made the decision
to go forward with placing M.G. on a medication prescribed by the child's
pediatrician. (R. at 694, pp. 466-467)
22.

During her visitation time with the children, the mother began having

M.G. treated by an unlicensed holistic provider in Las Vegas, without consulting with
the father or the child's medical providers (in violation of the Court's temporary
order). (R. at 693, pp. 69, 89, 90, 96, 163-167)
23.

During her visitation time with the children, without any prior

consultation with the father or M.G.'s medical providers, the mother unilaterally
discontinued M.G.'s prescription medication, and instead began treating the child
with holistic substances recommended by an unlicensed person. The mother did not
return the prescribed medication to the father at the end of her visit with M.G. (R. at
693 pp. 69, 74, 87-92, 96, 120-121, 175-179; R. at 694, pp. 361-361, 468-469)
24.

The mother is opposed to using drugs of any kind for the children. (R. at

639, p. 97) She never took the children to a medical doctor during the time the
children were with her in Las Vegas. (R. at 639, p. 114) She believes that the
medication prescribed by the doctor for M.G. is poison. (R. at 639, p. 178) The

11

mother described M.G.'s prescription medicine as "poison" in front of the parties'
children. (R.at 694, p. 470)
25.

During her parent time with M.G., the mother, in response to M.G.'s

behavior, restrained the child, stuffed a sock in M.G.'s mouth, and repeatedly spit
water in the child's face, "because she's [M.G.] scared of water and having water in
her face." The child's therapist in Utah was so concerned with the mother's behavior
that she reported the matter to Nevada Division of Child and Family Services. (R. at
687, p. 12; R. at 693, pp. 159-161, 198)
26.

Since she has been on the prescription medication, M.G. has been doing

well, and the father has observed positive results. (R. at 694, p. 479)
27.

The father is calmer than the mother with M.G., and M.G. is more

comfortable around the father. M.G. is happier and better behaved at the father's
home than at the mother's home. (R. at 687, p. 12) Some of her siblings believe that
M.G. is happier with her father. (R. at 687, p. 8)
28.

Some of her siblings believe that M.G. is happier with her father. (R. at

687, p. 8)
29.

During the months after the parties' separated, and while M.G. was

living with the father, she was showing "significant therapeutic successes." However,
after she spent a summer with her mother, M.G. "showed some regression in
counseling and was not as verbal as she had been previously." (R. at 687, p. 12)

30.

Before the parties' divorced, the mother was not active in the religion in

which the children were raised, but which they attended consistently with their father.
(R. at 693, pp. 105-106)
31.

The custody evaluator, Jay Jensen, considered moral character to be a

differentiating factor between the parties that is consequential to the children. The
mother's moral character has been detrimental to the children. (R. at 687, p. 13)
32.

The father does not suffer from any mental or psychological disabilities.

(R. at 693, p. 108; R. at 687, p. 14)
33.

The mother "was very controlling. She was clearly the dominant one in

the house. He [the father] could not please her (especially financially). She really put
him down. She could be vicious in knocking him down with her verbal attacks...She
was temperamental and explosive and would go off on him." The mother reported
"that marriage counselors and ecclesiastical leaders told her she was the problem . ..
." (R. at 687, 14)
34.

During the marriage, the father observed that the mother had difficulty

with her "volatile nature," and with temper around him and the children. She was
verbally aggressive toward him and the children at times. (R. at 694, p. 456)
35.

The father was "easy going, very layed [sic] back, almost a victim

stance." (R. at 687, p. 14)

36.

Since the mother has been living in Las Vegas, she "has done little to

maintain current awareness of her children in Utah." There are "very few incidences
in which she has availed herself of information concerning her children" from
teachers, day care providers, after-school providers, or therapists. (R. at 687, p. 24)
37.

The father has "far better insight into the children's needs" than the

mother. (R. at 687, p. 28; R. at 694, p. 470-471)
38.

The parties' children have always gone to the same schools in the Provo

area; and their mother agreed at trial that it was best for the children to stay in those
schools and in the same area, where all their friends lived (R. at 639, pp. 29, 109, 130131; R. at 694, p. 463).
39.

The mother testified that if she were allowed custody of the children,

she would remove them from their schools in Provo and move them to Las Vegas
(despite her earlier acknowledgement that such move was not in the children's best
interest). (R. at 639, pp. 131-132)
40.

Dr. Jensen concluded that the children's custody preferences were

unrelated to parents, but that they had a "very clear and unanimous" preference to
remain in their current residence in Provo where they had been raised their entire
lives, and where they had "establish integration in the local schools, with friends, and
the LDS church community." (R. at 687, pp. 8-9; R. at 694, p. 277)

41.

The mother testified that she is concerned that the children spend too

much time doing homework while they are with their father. She wants them to relax
more. (R. at 639, p. 186)
42.

Dr. Jensen found that the mother was "least likely to impose family

structure, and systematic parenting with her children,55 and that the father "is more
inclined to see the value in imposing some family structure with the children.55 (R. at
687, p. 9)
43.

Dr. Jensen also found that keeping the children from this marriage

together with their stepsiblings was not worth the change in the children's residence.
(R. at 694, p. 280)
44.

The mother and her new husband both testified that they did NOT

believe a joint custody arrangement would work. (R. at 639, pp. 186, 260-261)
45.

The mother's home in Las Vegas, where the children would have lived

if she had been awarded custody, would have had nine children living in three
bedrooms. (R. at 639, p. 152; R. at 639, p. 191)
46.

After the parties had five children, the father obtained a vasectomy to

prevent the parties from having more children. He wanted to help the parties5 live
within their means, which action upset the mother because she wanted to have more
children, despite limited income. (R. at 639, pp. 132-133, 195; R. at 687, p. 22)

1C

47.

The father was resourceful in obtaining support from the community for

the children, and he was able to provide for the parties' minor children despite his low
income. (R. at 639, pp. 25, 27-28, 39, 99, 138-139) The custody evaluator indicated
that Robert's "use of outside resources is a characteristic of successful single parent
families." (R. at 687, p. 20)
48.

The mother, who has limited self-control of the content of her

conversations with the children, speaks about the court proceedings and the outcome
of the custody case with the children, giving the children false expectations about the
outcome, while the father tells the children "not to worry about it." (R. at 687, pp. 2021)
49.

After she remarried, the mother gave birth to a Down's Syndrome,

special needs child with mental disabilities, that will occupy her attention, giving her
less time and ability to care for the parties' children. (R. at 693, pp. 7, 12, 104)
50.

The mother has had problems in controlling her temper around her

children. She hit two of her children on different occasions with a belt. She "has
periodically had an extremely difficult time in the management of her temper." She
"inflicted a physical injury on her daughter . . . ." Because of her actions she attended
domestic violence counseling at I SAT; but the "I SAT report also indicates that [the
mother] had also been physical with [A.] (R. at 693, p. 161; R. at 687, pp. 14, 19; R.
at 694, p. 294)
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51.

The custody evaluator made three findings regarding the mother's

abusive behavior. He found that the mother "has a documented history of being
physically and emotionally abusive towards members of her family." She "has a
documented and admitted history of anger control problems." He also concluded that
the "fundamental differences between [the mother] and [the father] with respect to the
risks to the children of abuse are night and day." (R. at 687, p. 19)
52.

The court-appointed guardian ad litem in this case recommended that

the mother participate in a Love and Logic course. The mother failed to participate in
that course. (R. at 693, p. 180-181)
53.

The mother admitted that she didn't dedicate as much time to her older

children from her prior relationships as she would have liked (R. at 693, p. 188-189)
54.

At the time of trial, the mother worked in operating an Herbal Life

Business. She was in the process of increasing that business, and contemplated that
she had the capacity to earn in excess of $5,000 per month from the business; which
would not allow her to care for the children without either diverting her attention from
children or using surrogate care. (R. at 693, pp. 51, 142; R. at 687, p. 16)
55.

Neither party has a problem with substance abuse. (R. at 687, p. 16)

56.

During the time the father had temporary custody of the parties'

children, the mother did not experience any problems with exercising visitation with
the children. (R. at 693, p. 112) The father was very generous regarding parent-time,
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and allowed the mother additional time with the children not ordered by the district
court. (R. at 693, pp. 42, 112-113, 141-142; R at 694, pp. 465-466, 477)
The father has been effective in communicating regarding parent-time with the
mother. (R. at 693, p. 142) The mother also received adequate telephone contact with
the children. (R. at 693, p. 170) The father has adopted a very open policy regarding
the mother's telephone communication with the children. (R at 694, p.465)
57.

The daycare provider reported that the children are always clean and

neatly dressed when the father drops them off. She also reported that the children and
their father are very loving toward each other. (R. at 693, p. 222)
58.

The daycare provider reported that after a visit with their mother, one of

the children said that she preferred to live with her father and not her mother. (R. at
693, p. 223)
59.

The mother's new husband gave it as his opinion that the father "seems

to be doing a killer job with the kids." (R. at 693, p. 244) He also believes that the
father is a good father. (R. at 693, p. 245)
60.

The mother's new husband has been crude, vulgar, and offensive in his

e-mail communication with the father. (R at 694, p. 465)
61.

The custody evaluator gave his opinion that the factor of greatest impact

on the children was factors dealing with stability in their lives, including stability in

staying in Utah where they are embedded in friendships, church, community, school,
etc. (R. at 694, p. 285)
62.

The custody evaluator also gave his opinion that for M.G. especially,

because of "the intensity of the social phobia, the changing of environments would
threaten at her core her ability to . . . socialize, fit in and . . . so maintaining continuity
of environment was .. . of critical importance for her." (R. at 694, p. 287).
62.

The custody evaluator noted that he was concerned about the mother's

use of her superior financial resources in an ongoing custody fight to exhaust the
father's limited resources. (R. at 687, p. 29)
63.

The father has been the primary caretaker of the parties' children since

at least the fall of 2006. (R at 687, p. 10).
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in the best
interest of the parties' minor children for their father to be awarded custody.
The trial court properly excluded Dennis Hopper from testifying, as he was not
qualified to testify regarding any relevant matters in this case; but even if his
exclusion as a witness was error, it was not harmful error.
The trial court made adequate findings as to its reasons for setting its parenttime order and for awarding Appellee sole physical and legal custody of the parties'
children.

The trial court acted properly within its discretion in refusing to award attorney
fees to Appellant.
Appellant failed to properly marshal the evidence presented in support of the
court's determinations, and the court of appeals should, therefore, accept the Court's
factual findings as correct.
Although the issue of child support was not properly raised as an issue or
argued in Appellant's brief, but only mentioned in passing in her argument summary,
the only error by the Court in this case was to set child support too low.
Appellant and Appellee have reached a stipulated agreement and order
regarding custody and parent-time during the pendency of a Petition to Modify case
filed by Appellant after this appeal. Appellant's stipulation to such order renders the
appeal of child custody and parent-time issues moot.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT WAS IN
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PARTIES' CHILDREN THAT THEY
RESIDE PRIMARILY WITH THEIR FATHER.
As Appellant correctly asserts, that the trial court must determine custody
matters based on the children's best interest. It is also true that one prominent factor,
among others, to consider in custody determinations, is the identity of the primary
caretaker of the children. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986).

While identification of the primary caretaker was a prominent factor in Pusey,
neither that case nor the Davis case (relied on by Appellant) claim that the primary
caretaker factor outweighs all other factor; and there is no indication that it is even the
most important factor in a custody determination. Id; Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647
(Utah 1988).
Pusey also does not specify the relative weight that the trial court should give
each of the various custody factors; it only states that certain factors are important or
prominent in the context of that case.
The cases that address custody determinations have not limited courts to a
definitive or narrow checklist of factors that must be given a certain weight. While
district courts should certainly consider statutory factors (which it did in this case), the
court can look at any relevant factors that reflects on the best interest of the children.
Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1992).
Interestingly, in the Davis case, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court's
decision to award custody to a father, even though it appeared that the father had only
been the primary caretaker of the parties' child during the pendency of that case, and
for a short time before the case commenced. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah
1988).
In the instant case, Appellant claims that the "primary caretaker" factor weighs
in her favor. That is NOT true. As in the Davis case, the Appellee has been the

primary caretaker of the parties' children since at least the fall of 2006 (R. at 687, p.
10). The issue of primary caretaker and its impact on the children in this case was
addressed in depth by the custody evaluator, Dr. Jay Jensen, and by the trial court.
The custody evaluator spent the better part of three pages of his evaluation addressing
this issue (R. at 687, pp. 10-12). The trial court adopted the custody evaluator's
findings on this issue by reference, as if set forth in full in its own findings (Exhibit C
to Appellant's brief, Second Amended Memorandum Decision, p. 4). The trial court
also found that "[b]oth of these parties were equally engaged in the care and nurturing
of the children before the divorce." Id. at p. 7. The facts support a finding that the
parties were equal caretakers before the parties' separated, and that Appellant was the
primary caretaker thereafter.
What Appellant fails to note in her brief is that Pusey also directs that
"[a]nother important factor should be the stability of the environment provided by
each parent." Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted).
Stability for the children is such an important custody factor that it can
override the "primary caretaker" factor. See, e.g., Erwin v. Erwin, 113 P.2d 847
(Utah App. 1989). Likewise, the fact that one parent has more time to spend with the
children can be overcome by other factors. Wall v. Wall, 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1985).
In the instant case, the custody evaluator found stability to be the factor of
greatest impact on the children. (R. at 694, p. 285) The trial court found that the

stability provided by the father was superior to what the mother would provide. If the
children remained with the father they would maintain stability by staying in the
home to which they were acclimated (whereas the mother intended to move the
children to Las Vegas). The father was also found to be "most likely to provide a
stable, nurturing home life coupled with on-going earnest efforts to allow and
continue a relationship between the children and the other party." (Exhibit C to
Appellant's Brief, Second Amended Memorandum Decision, p. 13) Stability was
especially important in this case for the parties' special needs child, which the court
found outweighed any negative consequence of surrogate care. Id. The father was
found to be more emotionally stable than the mother; and the court expressed concern
about the children being subject to more emotional turmoil in the mother's home. Id.
at pp. 10-11. The mother also had issues with her past religious stability, although the
trial court felt that factor was not significant at the time of trial. Id. at 10. The trial
court was also concerned about the mother's violent and difficult temper. Id. at 11.
And it was concerned about the mother's ability to maintain a stable relationship with
her new husband, which could impact the children adversely. Id. In addition, the
father was found to be more likely to allow the mother access to the parties' children.
Id. at 12. The children had been doing well in the father's home. Id. The mother was
less likely to foster on-going respect for the other parent, and was demonstrably more
likely to place her own needs ahead of the children's needs. Id.

Appellant claims that the trial court weighted all the factors evenly. There is
no evidence that the trial court weighted all factors evenly, and Appellant does cite to
any portion of the court's decision where the trial court so indicated. Nothing
indicates that the trial court gave improper weight to any factor. It agreed with the
custody evaluator that the children's stability was the most important factor.
The Appellant also claims that the trial court should have awarded joint
custody, but does not elaborate on why Judge Taylor's detailed five-page analysis of
each and every factor of Section 30-3-10.2(2), Utah Code Annotated was faulty.
Instead, she simplistically points to two custody factors that she thinks might weigh in
her favor, and argues that the Court of Appeals should disregard the myriad other
factors considered by the trial court in this case.
She also inaccurately claims that the trial court found that six of the nine joint
custody factors of Section 30-3-10.2(2), Utah Code Annotated point toward an order
of joint custody (Appellant's brief, p. 30). The trial court actually found only two of
the nine factors supported a joint custody order (Exhibit C to Appellant's Brief,
Second Amended Memorandum Decision, pp. 4-9). The rest of those factors directed
that joint custody would not be effective in this case.
Taken as a whole, the district court's decision carefully and comprehensively
considered all aspects of the parties' circumstances in determining custody. It
explicitly considered the application of the case facts to all of the factors of Section

3 0-3 -10(1 )(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated in forming its custody decision. It also
carefully and explicitly considered the application of the case facts to Section 30-310.2(2), Utah Code Annotated in its decision regarding whether to implement sole
custody or joint custody. In short, it correctly found that it would be in the children's
best interest to award sole legal and physical custody to the father.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED DAVID HOPPER'S
TESTIMONY.
Rule 702(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that an expert qualified by

"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" may testify by giving an
opinion or otherwise if such "specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
District courts are given considerable latitude in making the determination
whether a particular "expert" witness is qualified as such, or whether the testimony
sought to be offered by the expert exceeds the expert's qualifications. Carbaugh v.
Asbestos Corp, Ltd., 2007 UT 65, f7, 167 P.3d 1063 (citing State v. Brown, 948 P.2d
337, 340 (Utah 1997)); Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest
Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995), rehearing denied.
Additionally, in order for an expert to be allowed to testify, sufficient
foundation must be laid for admission of the expert testimony, and the trial court's
determination of whether such proper foundation has been laid is also within the trial

court's discretion. Vitalefor Christensen v. Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 361
(Utah App. 1996) (citing Casida v. Deland, 866 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah App.1993)).
In the instant case, the trial court determined that David Hopper did not have
the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to assist the trial
court to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. It also concluded that
Mr. Hopper's testimony would not assist it in this case. Furthermore, insufficient
foundation was laid to permit Mr. Hopper to testify as an expert regarding the matters
which Appellant sought to have him testify. For those reasons, the trial court acted
properly, within its broad discretionary powers, to exclude Mr. Hopper as an expert
witness.
According to Appellant's brief, Mr. Hopper's intended testimony was in two
areas. First, he was to testify as an expert in rebuttal of the trial court's appointed
custody evaluator.1 Second, he was to testify regarding the effect of certain
medications upon the brain of one of the parties' children.
Rule 4-903 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration provides the minimum
qualification for custody evaluators. Under that rule, a custody evaluator must be (a)
1

Although she now claims that Mr. Hopper would rebut the custody evaluator's
testimony, at trial the Appellant's attorney represented to the court that Mr. Hopper
would not testify regarding the custody evaluation, but would testify regarding "the
evaluation and treatment of. .. [M.G.], and evaluation of the clinical testing work that
was done on Olga in connection with ... the .. . custody evaluation." (R. at 694, p.
411)

a licensed clinical social worker; (b) a doctoral-level psychologist; (c) a physician
who is board-certified in psychiatry; or (d) a licensed marriage and family therapist
with at least a Master's degree.
In the instant case, Dennis Hopper did not meet any of the foregoing minimum
qualifications (R. at 694, pp. 405-406) (Mr. Hopper was specifically asked regarding
each of the four minimum requirements, summarized above, and he admitted that he
did not meet any of those qualifications). His only valid license was as an alcohol and
drug abuse counselor in Nevada. (R. at 694, p. 405)
As Mr. Hopper failed to meet any of the qualifications needed to conduct a
custody evaluation, he certainly could not rebut the court-appointed custody
evaluator's testimony or attack evaluator's methodology. Generally, a rebuttal expert
must be qualified in the same field as the expert he seeks to rebut. Evans ex rel
Evans v. Langston, 2007 UT App 240, ^flO, 166 P.3d 621 (upholding the trial court's
refusal to qualify a rebuttal expert, because the rebuttal expert was trained in a
different field than the expert he sought to rebut). Because he was not qualified to be
a custody evaluator, he was not qualified to rebut a custody evaluator.
Regarding the claim that Mr. Hopper intended to testify regarding the effect of
certain drugs on one of the children's brain (Presumably, he intended to testify that
the holistic medicine, Gaba, administered by the mother, was superior to the
medication the child's doctor prescribed), the trial court found that none of Mr.
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Hopper's training or experience was relevant to the issues before it, as there were no
issues or testimony in this case regarding addiction, drug abuse, or brain injury
(which, in combination with his experience as a substitute school teacher, were Mr.
Hopper areas of experience and training). (R. at 694, p. 411) His only license was as
an alcohol and drug abuse counselor in Nevada. (R. at 694, p. 405) His vitae did not
claim that he had any formal education, (See Exhibit "D" to Brief of Appellant)
although he contradicted his vitae at trial, and claimed that he had received formal
education through a then-unaccredited university that permitted him to receive a
degree based on his claim of having prior experience. (R. at 694, pp. 406-408) His
vitae was filled with miscellaneous irrelevant seminars, certifications, purchased
achievements (E.g., Who's Who in various professions, Men of Achievement,
Dictionary of International Biography, etc.) and memberships (See Exhibit "D" to
Brief of Appellant). He waffled and was non-committal about whether he could
perform a custody evaluation. When asked if he could even evaluate substance abuse
in a custody case, he answered, "No." (R. at 694, p. 409) He said that he could
perform custody evaluations if he had training; but admitted that he did not have the
training or license to do so. (R. at 694, p. 409)
Furthermore, Appellant did not establish a sufficient foundation to show that
Mr. Hopper was qualified to expertly address any of the issues relevant to this case.
Counsel elicited only vague and largely irrelevant information from Mr. Hopper

regarding his training and experience—which focused mostly on traumatic brain
injury and his work a school teacher. Absent from the foundational questions were
any reference to any qualifications regarding use of the prescription medication M.G.
was taking, or even to his experience with Gaba or other holistic medicines. Nothing
in his testimony or his vitae indicated that he had any prior experience with or
education about treating persons with Selective Mutism. He made a passing reference
to dealing with developmental disorders, like Autism, but never claimed to be able to
treat Selective Mutism; and he never elaborated on exactly what he had done or how
he had been educated to "deal" with "developmental disorders like autism, addiction
and other mental health issues." (R. at 694, p. 401)
In short, Appellant failed to lay an adequate foundation to show a sufficient
nexus between Mr. Hopper's training and experience, and M.G.'s condition or the
drugs she was taking. Nor was Mr. Hopper qualified to rebut the custody evaluator's
testimony. The trial court's decision to exclude Mr. Hopper's testimony was proper,
and was well within its discretion.
III.

EVEN IF THE EXCLUSION OF DENNIS HOPPER'S TESTIMONY
WAS ERRONEOUS, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS.
Even if a trial court errs in excluding an expert witness, such error does not

constitute grounds for reversing the trial court's decision if such error was harmless.

E.g., State v. Gallegos, 220 P.3d 136, 145 (Utah 2009) (finding that although the
Court erred in failing to admit expert testimony, the error was harmless).
In the instant case, Mr. Hopper was not qualified to perform a custody
evaluation; and for that reason he certainly did not qualify to contradict the findings,
methods, conclusions, and opinions of the court-appointed custody evaluator.
His testimony, then, at best, would have been limited to M.G.'s treatment, the
effect of Prozac and Gaba on her brain, and her progress while on holistic medicine as
compared to her progress on Prozac. If qualified, perhaps he could have also testified
somewhat regarding the mother's mental health (although it was not clear from
Appellant's brief, or otherwise, how the mother's mental health was a factor in this
case).
His testimony may have been able to bolster the mother's argument that she
did not act contrary to the child's best interest when she violated the court order by
unilaterally stopping M.G.'s prescription medication, and substituted the prescribed
medication with a holistic medication recommended by Mr. Hopper.
However, the trial court did not rely on the suitability of holistic medications
for M.G. as a factor in determining custody. In its decision, the trial court minimized
the importance of whether the use of holistic medicine by the mother was better than
the father's use of traditional medicine. Instead, it focused on the fact that the strong
difference of opinion between the parents on how to medicate M.G., and their

inability to communicate effectively regarding medical treatment, showed that the
parties could not implement joint custody. (Exhibit C to Appellant's brief, Second
Amended Memorandum Decision, pp. 5, 8)
Even if Mr. Hopper had testified, and had been somehow able to persuade the
trial court that his holistic approach was superior to traditional medicine, that
testimony would not have impacted the trial court's ruling that parents were unable to
implement joint custody, because of their stark difference of opinion, and inability to
cooperate, in deciding how to medicate their daughter.
Regarding the mother's mental health, even if sufficient foundation had been
laid to show how Mr. Hopper was qualified to testify regarding the mother's mental
health, the mother's mental health was not a factor in the trial court's decision.
Although the court made a passing reference to the mother having suffered from
depression in the past, Judge Taylor never mentioned the mother's current mental
health, or found that her mental health was a factor in his custody determination.
(Exhibit C to Appellant's brief, Second Amended Memorandum Decision, p. 10) It
appears that even if Mr. Hopper had been permitted to testify that the mother was
mentally healthy, such testimony would not have influenced the Court's decision.
In conclusion, even if Mr. Hopper had testified, his testimony would have been
of no practical importance to the case, and would not have impacted the trial court's

decision in any meaningful way. Therefore, any error in excluding Mr. Hopper was
harmless.

VI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SET A PARENT-TIME SCHEDULE
FOR THE PARTIES.
Section 30-3-34(1) provides that the Court "may establish a parent-time
schedule consistent with the best interests of the child." U.C.A. §30-3-34(1). It then
goes on the state, in Section 30-3-34(2), that the advisory guidelines of Section 30-333 and Section 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 are presumed to be in the child's best interest.
However, the presumption that the statutory parent-time schedule is in the
children's best interest is rebutted if any one of the criteria listed in 30-3-34(2) is
found to apply. One of those criteria, which clearly applies in this case, is 30-334(2)(a)—the fact that the parties live a substantial distance from each other. Because
a substantial distance exists between the mother's residence in Las Vegas and the
father's residence in Utah County, the presumptive guidelines were rebutted, and the
trial court was free to determine a parent-time schedule that it found to be in the
children's best interest.
Appellant's brief claims that the trial court did not make "any analysis of the
distance between the parties." That is not true. Judge Taylor specifically found that
"[t]he distance between Las Vegas and Provo is substantial." (Exhibit C to
Appellant's brief, Second Amended Memorandum Decision, p. 7) He also implicitly

found that the distance between the parties was too substantial to allow the
presumptive parent-time schedule to apply, when he concluded that Petitioner was the
relocating parent under Section 30-3-37(7), Utah Code Annotated. Id. at 14.
Concluding that the presumptive parent-time schedule was not appropriate, the
trial court adopted the custody evaluator's recommended parent-time schedule by
reference. (R. at 560, p. 4; R. at 687, pp. 28-29)
When Appellant's attorney subsequently filed a Motion to Alter, Amend, or
Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 583), Judge Taylor
scheduled oral arguments on that motion and made a supplemental ruling. (R. at 599)
A copy of the supplemental ruling is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
In the supplemental ruling, the Court's only change to the evaluator's
recommendation was to clarify that he would not be allowing the father the
recommended additional two weeks of summer time with the children. The court said
regarding that deviation:
The Court specifically departs from Dr. Jensen's recommendation regarding
Robert having an additional two weeks of parent time in the summer. Since
the children will be with Olga in the summer only from just after Father's day
to July 23 rd (a period of approximately six weeks) they will be with Robert the
remainder of the summer. There is no need for an additional two week period
with FLobert during Olga's time in June and July. The visitation would simply
add to the travel requirements and negatively impact the need the children have
for stability.
R. at 594-595, p. 5 of supplement ruling, attached as Exhibit A.

Interestingly, the effect of the Court's decision was to eliminate two weeks of
parent time for the father, which he would have had if the Court had followed the
evaluator's written recommendation. It is difficult to see how such reduction of the
Appellee's parent time would form a basis for Appellant to be dissatisfied with the
parent-time order.
The trial court also stated a rational basis for eliminating this time. It
determined that the additional travel would be a burden on the parties and the
children, and would negatively impact the children's stability.
Regardless, though, this issue is now moot, as the Appellant has now relocated
to Utah, filed a Petition to Modify the custody and parent-time schedule, and the
parties have reached an agreement for a temporary order in which the father retains
custody of children and the mother exercises parent-time consistent with the statutory
parent time of Section 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated (See Exhibit B for a copy of the
order that was based on the parties' agreement in open court).
V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DEVIATED FROM THE CUSTODY
EVALUATOR'S RECOMMENDATION REGARDING JOINT
CUSTODY
Although it is true that the court-appointed evaluator recommended a joint

legal custody arrangement, the evaluator also recommended that primary physical
placement of the children be with the father.

However, the evidence presented at trial, and the factors to be considered in
deciding whether to implement joint legal custody, clearly demonstrated that joint
legal custody was not appropriate in the context of this case.
The Appellant and her new husband both testified that they did not believe a
joint custody arrangement was appropriate or would work in this case. (R. at 639, pp.
186,250,261)
Furthermore, the trial court conducted an in-depth analysis of the nine statutory
factors of Section 30-3-10.2(2), Utah Code Annotated, which courts should consider
in deciding whether to implement joint legal custody. After reviewing those factors,
the Court determined that seven of the nine factors indicated that joint legal custody
would not be proper in this case. (Exhibit C to Appellant's Brief, Second Amended
Memorandum Decision, pp. 4-9)
A trial court is not bound to accept all of the recommendations made by a
court-appointed evaluator, so long as the trial court has some reason for rejecting
those recommendations. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1992).
Contrary to the Appellant's assertions, in this case the trial court did make
specific findings as the basis for its divergence from Dr. Jensen's recommendations,
and spent five pages of its ruling addressing those findings. Appellant has not made
any effort to show how those findings were improper, irrational, or an abuse of
discretion.

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REUSING TO AWARD APPELLANT ATTORNEY FEES.
In deciding whether to award attorney fees in this case, the trial court was

dealing with two issues. First it had to determine what, if anything, should be
assessed as attorney fees in the divorce action pursuant to Section 30-3-3(2) (based on
ability to pay). Second, it had to determine what, if anything, should be assessed for
attorney fees related to the pre-trial litigation regarding the support payment, which
resulted in Appellee being found in contempt.
Judge Taylor decided to consider both of these attorney fees issues together
and treat them as a coordinated whole. He looked at the totality of the parties'
circumstances, including the children's needs, the ability of the parties to pay fees,
and the parties' behavior since the alimony hearing (i.e., that Appellee had purged his
contempt by making timely payments). (R. at 562)
The trial court is not required to impose attorney fees as a sanction for
contempt.

Instead, because divorce cases are highly equitable in nature, it is

appropriate for the trial court to take into consideration the parties' entire
circumstances in making any order regarding enforcement of a divorce order, by
contempt or otherwise, based on what he believes to be fair and justified. Lord v.
Shaw, 682 P.2d 853, 856 (Utah 1984).

In this case, Judge Taylor decided to balance the financial needs of the children
and the fact that the father had purged his contempt, against the need or desireability
to award fees for contempt. He elected, within his discretion, to give greater weight
to the children's needs and the father's subsequent behavior, rather than punishing
father and the children financially. Such determination was a reasonable exercise of
discretion.
VII.

APPELLANT FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION REGARDING
THE VARIOUS ISSUES SHE RAISED.
It is the Appellant's obligation to marshal every scrap of evidence that supports

the Court's findings. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233,fflj21, 56 (Footnote 5),
quoting West Valley City v. Majesticlnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)
("In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is
clearly erroneous."). This is as true in child custody cases as in other determinations
where the Court's findings are at issue. State, In Interest ofJ.M. V, 958 P.2d 943, 947
(Utah App. 1998) (citing Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah App. 1996)).

If Appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court ignores
her arguments regarding the court's findings, and assumes that there was sufficient
evidence upon which the trial court based its findings. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876
P.2d 429, 431 (Utah App. 1994) ("if the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and
proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case"); Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312
(Utah 1997) ("When a party fails to .. . marshal the evidence in support of [a] finding,
we 'assume[] that the record supports the fmding[]. .. ."' (alterations in original)
(citations omitted)); In re D.G., 938 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah App.1997) (Appellant "must
marshall [sic] the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence." (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
"The process of marshaling is ... fundamentally different from that of
presenting the evidence at trial. The challenging party must temporarily remove its
own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position; [the challenging party]
must play the devil's advocate. In so doing, appellants must present the evidence in a
light most favorable to the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a
light favorable to their case." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 78, 100 P.3d 1177
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, Appellant has not even attempted to remove her own
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position. She has selectively chosen
only some of the evidence in support of the court's decision, and interwoven that with
evidence that she believes supports her position. Her "marshaling" amounts to merely
rearguing the evidence from her perspective, while conspicuously excluding some of
the evidence that is most damning to her case.
Because all four of Appellant's issues require that she show abuse of discretion
in the Court's findings, and as she has failed to properly marshal the evidence
regarding any of those four factually-intensive issues, the appellate court must
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and should affirm the trial
court's findings.
VIII. THE ISSUE OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS NOT PROPERLY RAISED OR
BRIEFED BY COUNSEL; OR THE ONLY ERROR BY THE TRIAL
COURT WAS ITS FAILURE TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO PAY
ENOUGH CHILD SUPPORT.
In her Summary of the Argument, Appellant indicates that she believes that the
Court ordered her to pay too much child support (Appellant's Brief, p. 25). She
never, however, makes any argument in the body of her brief on this issue. Nor does
she list child support among her "Issues Presented." It appears that she original
contemplated raising this issue, but then changed her mind and forgot to remove it
completely from her brief.

The court should ignore Appellant's passing references to child support as not
properly raised or briefed on appeal.
If anything, the Court failed to require that Appellant pay sufficient child
support. Sections 78B-12-203(7)(b) and (c) require that
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from employment
opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings
for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning
for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found in
the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown,
income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour
work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or
the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific
findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
It appears from these statutes, especially Section 78B-12-203(7)(c), that the
legislature did not intend to normally have income imputed at an amount less than the
federal minimum wage, and that such minimum imputation should be a floor in most
cases for determining child support.
In this case, the mother's undisputed testimony was that she had the capacity to
earn $5,000 per month (R. at 693, p. 142). But the trial court ignored the Appellant's
own testimony regarding her employment potential, and instead imputed income to
the mother at the unbelievably low amount of $623.04 per month—less than even
minimum wage income. (R. at 595) Although the court chose to reject the mother's

own admission that she could earn $5,000 per month, it is hard to understand why the
trial court did not impute at least minimum wage income to the Appellant.
Section 78B-12-203(1) provides, in relevant part, that gross income for child
support purposes "includes prospective income from any source, including earned and
nonearned income sources which may include salaries, wages, commissions,
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay,
pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital
gains, Social Security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs."
At trial the undisputed testimony was that Appellant's new husband paid all of
the mother's living expenses, including housing, utilities, her credit card payments,
etc. (R. at 693, p. 153) Those payments were in the nature of gifts to Appellant, and
clearly should have qualified as Appellant's income under the express language "gifts
from anyone" of Section 78B-12-203(1). Certainly, if alimony from a prior spouse is
income, then income from a current spouse that is admittedly given as a gift to
support that spouse should also be considered income for child support purposes.
Although Appellee argued this issue at trial, the trial court rejected the argument as
too novel.

If the trial court had imputed a proper level of income to the Appellee, then she
would have paid significantly more child support in this case than the current order.
If the Court of Appeals is inclined to consider this issue (despite the obvious defects
in how Appellant presented it to the Court), then it should, as part of that
consideration, determine whether the trial court set the Appellant's imputed income
too low, based on the evidence presented at trial the statutory mandates.
IX.

APPEAL OF THE CUSTODY/PARENT-TIME ISSUES IS RENDERED
MOOT BY THE PARTIES' SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT
REGARDING CUSTODY AND PARENT TIME.
Subsequent to the filing of the appeal in this case, Appellant relocated from

Las Vegas to Utah and filed a Petition to Modify the Custody and Visitation orders
entered in this case.
On November 30, 2009, the parties reached an agreement in open court
regarding future custody and parent-time in this case. They stipulated, in relevant
part, that "Robert Lee Grindstaff, shall retain physical and legal custody of the
parties' minor children." (Exhibit B, "Order on Motion for Temporary Orders," ][ 1).
They also agreed that beginning January 30, 2010 "Olga Lucia Bradley, shall be
entitled to parent time with the parties' minor children] in accordance with Section
30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated." Id. at \ 2.

When the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the participants,
appellate courts will decline to review the moot matter. E.g., State v. Sims, 881 P.2d
840, 841 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Court of Appeals' decision on custody and parent-time will not
affect the parties' rights. Subsequent to the appeal in this case, the parties reached a
negotiated agreement regarding future custody and parent-time. The trial court
accepted their agreement and entered an order in conformity therewith. Their
agreement renders any decision by this Court meaningless on those issues. Even if
this Court were to overturn the trial court's decision regarding custody or parent-time,
that reversal would not impact the parties' agreement or the order which flowed from
that agreement, as the agreement occurred after their right of appeal had already
accrued.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee respectfully submits that the trial court's
decision should be affirmed.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Olga Lucia Grindstaff,
Petitioner

:
:

Ruling

vs.

:

Date: September 24,2008

Robert Lee Grindstaff,

:

Case Number: 064402197

:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Respondent

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on the motion of the Petitioner
("Olga")1 for additional findings or clarifications from the decision of the Court rendered after
trial on June 2 and 3, 2008. Each request will be addressed:
Herbalife Distributorship
No testimony was presented during the trial which would allow the Court to determine a
value for the distributorship as a business entity. Indeed, there was no discussion or testimony
about how the business was formally organized. Implicit in the testimony of herbalife business
activities was the notion that the business centers upon the sales efforts of Olga and her daughter.
The determination of income assumed an on-going ability of Olga to continue these activities. It
was the intent of the Court that all right in the "distributorship," whatever legal formulation it
might take should be equitably awarded to Olga as her sole property. The value of the business

x

To avoid the confusion rampant in this Court's last attempt at a written decision in this
case, the Petitioner will be designated as "Olga" and the Respondent as "Robert."
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to Olga is reflected in the income imputed to Olga. No other evidence justifies assigning an
independent value to the company.
Time Share Condominium
In the previous decision the Court noted that Robert agreed that the time share
condominium should be awarded to Olga, subject to her assumption of any and all associated
expenses and debt. Olga now avers, through counsel, that the property has a "negative value"
(more is owed than it is worth) and that she doesn't (and never did) want the property. The Court
assumed at the time of the trial, from the testimony and discussion of the timeshare that the
property had no significant market value. The asset represents a family recreational opportunity
rather than an item of intrinsic or immediate market value. As between Olga and Robert, only
Olga is financially able to take advantage by paying the debt and related expenses. This
conclusion rests upon the finding, noted below, that although Olga presently has only limited
income from Herbalife sales and she has an infant special needs child, her living circumstances
axe significantly more advantaged than Robert because of the income and support of her present
husband, Tom. The Court concludes that in spite of her reluctance the most equitable result is to
award that property to her. It is specifically intended to be her sole property-meaning she has the
complete option to keep and use the timeshare or sell it for whatever can be obtained. What she
must not do is simply disavow the timeshare and fail to hold Robert harmless from the related
debt and expenses. As an equitable division of the property and obligations of this marriage this
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Court finds that because Olga is most financially able to pay and use the asset that she should
assume both the benefits and obligations of the timeshare entirely.
40IK Retirement Funds
This asset was only vaguely referenced during the trial. The fund was created by
contributions from Robert during the marriage while he was employed. All parties agree that the
total value is slightly more than $1000 although counsel for Robert pointed out during oral
arguments that before the trial of this case Robert borrowed an amount equivalent to the value to
contribute to attorney fees. The Court has already determined that although each party should
bear their own attorney fees Robert is financially unable to contribute more to costs or attorney
fees. Given the relative disparity of their income and present needs related to the children the
Court finds that the most equitable award of the 40 IK is to leave it entirely in the name of
Robert.
Parent Time
The Court has already made extensive and careful findings related to the determination of
custody and parent time. Moreover, the information gathered and reported by Dr. Jensen was
adopted and included, by reference, into the Court's memorandum decision. Although the Court
disagreed with some of Dr. Jensen's conclusions the Court specifically adopted his
recommendations for long term visitation. So that there is no confusion the Court will re-state its
ruling regarding parent time. Robert and Olga will have the children on specific holidays:
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Robert
Martin Luther King Weekend
Spring Break
Pioneer Day
Labor Day Weekend
Thanksgiving (odd years)

Olga
Presidents Day Weekend
Memorial Day Weekend
Independence Day
Fall Break (UEA)
Thanksgiving (even years)

Entire Christmas break (even years)

Entire Christmas break (odd years)

Where applicable, all holidays include the child's entire break from school to include
teacher comp days, snow days, or other days where children are released from school at, or
around, the time of the holiday.
Olga may visit the children in Utah in addition to the schedule provided that 10 days
advance written notice is given although such visits may not interfere with the specific holiday
parent time noted above.
The children are to spend Mother's Day weekend with Olga and Father's Day weekend
with Robert. The children are to be allowed, if they wish, to spend parent's birthdays with that
parent.
During the summer the children stay with Robert until the Father's Day visit is
concluded. They will then go with Olga until they return to Utah by 9:00 p.m. on July 23rd each
year to begin parent time with Robert on the 24th of July.
The Court specifically departs from Dr. Jensen's recommendation regarding Robert
having an additional two weeks of parent time in the summer. Since the children will be with
Olga in the summer only from just after Father's day to July 23rd (a period of approximately six
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weeks) they will be with Robert the remainder of the summer. There is no need for an additional
two week period with Robert during Olga's time in June and July. That visitation would simply
add to the travel requirements and negatively impact the need the children have for stability.
Child Support
The Court previously determined gross income for the parties. Robert's income was
determined to be $2,776.29 per month. Olga's income was imputed at $623.04. Total family
income was, therefore, $3399.33. The decision was made following trial on June 2 and 3, 2008.
Olga, at the time of trial, had two children in her home-one an adult daughter from a previous
relationship and the other an infant child from her present re-marriage. Until the time of trial
child support was accrued and/or paid under a temporary order issued in October, 2007. Custody
was awarded to Robert as a sole custody order. Olga's present husband, Tom, testified that for
the last ten years he has earned "in the mid-100's." To a preponderance, his income would be
$12,500 per month. He has an ex-wife and four children. Alimony and child support from that
relationship were unsettled at the time of trial.
U.C.A. section 78B-12-301 specifically provides that the tables in subsection (1) are to be
used for a modification to an order established or last modified before December 31, 2007. The
temporary order issued in October was just that, temporary. The order was subject to complete
revision at the time of trial. The Court finds that the first "order" for the purpose of 78B-12-301
was made at the time of trial. Child support will, therefore, be determined using the tables from
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subsection (2).
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Judge James R>
Fourth Judicial District Coi
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Petitioner:
James G. Clark
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STATS OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY ORDERS

Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF,
Respondent.

Civil No. 064402197
Judge Taylor
Commissioner Patton

This matter came before the Court, Commissioner Thomas Patton presiding, on
November 30, 2009. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, James G. Clark.
Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The parties reached an
agreement regarding the Motion in this matter. The parties' agreement was stated by counsel on
the record, and each party consented on the record. Based upon the parties' agreement, and good
cause appearing, it is HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Respondent, Robert Lee Grindstaff, shall retain physical and legal custody of the

parties' minor children.

2.

Except as otherwise set forth in this order, Petitioner, Olga Lucia Bradley, shall be

entitled to parent time with the parties' minor child in accordance with Section 30-3-35, Utah
Code Annotated.
3.

The parties' children participate in an after-school program each day after school.

Notwithstanding the foregoing parent-time schedule, Petitioner's parent time shall commence
only after all of the children have finished their after-school program. If all of the children have
finished the after-school program by 4:00 p.m., then the Respondent shall deliver the children to
the Petitioner's home at that time. If the children have not all finished the after-school program
by 4:00 p.m., then the Respondent shall deliver the children to the Petitioner's home after the
children are finished at 5:30 p.m. During Petitioner's midweek visit(s), Petitioner shall return the
children to Respondent's home at 8:00 p.m. During other visits, Petitioner shall return the
children to Respondent's home at the time specified in Section 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated.
4.

The Petitioner may participate in the children's school activities and functions,

provided she does so appropriately and without interference with the children's education or
activities.
5.

For the next sixty (60) days, from November 30, 2009 through January 29, 2010,

the Petitioner's parent-time shall be altered somewhat, as follows:
a.

During that sixty-day period, in lieu of Petitioner's midweek visit, the

Petitioner shall have the children on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday evening from the time

the children are dropped off at the Petitioner's house, as specified in paragraph 3, supra, until
8-00 pm.
b.

During that sixty-day period, Petitioner shall deliver the children to

Respondent's home ward for church services at the beginning of those services, and shall retrieve
the children from Respondent's home ward at the end of those services. The children shall
attend church services m Respondent's home ward every Sunday.
6.

Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, beginning January 30, 2010 the

provisions of paragraph 5 of this order shall no longer apply, and the additional midweek visits
and Sunday church attendance shall automatically cease.
7.

The parties shall participate in mediation. Petitioner's attorney shall attempt to

schedule mediation through the Utah Court of Appeals. If he is unable to obtain the Court of
Appeal's services for mediation, then mediation shall be conducted by Sandra Dredge, unless the
parties agree on the use of some other mediator.
DATED this rj

day of

V^Kf)

, 2C

BY THE COURT:

cr-<

„
/o

y

&.<fjf

-^ ^

^K» ^

4$

,y

Dism&tffflkm&fa tp*
THOMAS PATTON
District Court Commissioner

